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WAL-MART, SHOPKO CART GATHERING: A CASE




In the fall of 2005, the media gave broad coverage to a leaked
memorandum intended for Wal-Mart's board of directors that
contained recommendations directed at reducing its healthcare
costs by attracting a younger workforce and promoting the
physical well-being of its employees by designing "all jobs to
include some physical activity (e.g., all cashiers do some cart
gathering)."' The Memorandum, prepared by McKinsey &
Company and authored by Wal-Mart vice president Susan
Chambers, caused the Wall Street Journal to ask: "Can
Employers Alter Hiring Policies to Cut Health Care Costs?"2
About the same time, I received a call to my law school-
based senior legal helpline from a sixty-three-year-old woman
with health problems who contended she was constructively
* Michael J. Myers is an Associate Professor with joint appointment to
the University of South Dakota School of Law where he teaches
healthcare law and policy, and elder law, and the School of Business
where he teaches health law, health economics, and health finance.
Prior to joining the University, he served as CEO of Mayo-St. Mary's
Hospital in Rochester, Minnesota, and Fairview Riverside Medical
Center in Minneapolis.
1. Memorandum from Susan Chambers to the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Board of
Directors, Reviewing and Revising Wal-Mart's Benefits Strategy, at 14, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/business/26walmart.pdf (last visited Nov. 8,
2006) [hereinafter Wal-Mart Memorandum].
2. Ann Zimmerman et al., Can Employers Alter Hiring Policies to Cut Health
Costs?, WALL ST. J. (E. ed.), Oct. 27, 2005, at B1.
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discharged by an Iowa ShopKo store that had implemented the
practice contemplated in the Wal-Mart memorandum. 3 Her
customer service position had been subjected to a storewide
policy requiring her to gather carts from the parking lot, drive a
forklift, and transfer appliances into customer vehicles. I
referred her to a law firm recommending that the case be used to
test whether the physical activity requirement for all employees
might form the basis for a successful Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)4 challenge based upon the
disparate impact doctrine. This recommendation was made in
light of the Supreme Court's 2005 ruling in Smith v. City of
Jackson' that the ADEA authorizes recovery on a disparate
impact theory, resolving a long-standing split among the
circuits. 6 The sixty-three-year-old woman is part of a pending
class action lawsuit against ShopKo.7 This article uses the
Memorandum and the ShopKo Class Action to argue that an
across-the-board physical activity job design would fail under
the "business necessity" exception to disparate impact under the
ADEA.
THE LEAKED MEMORANDUM
The Memorandum is directed at a legitimate cost-reduction
objective: controlling healthcare costs in a globally-competitive
market. The Memorandum states that "[Wal-Mart management]
evaluated Wal-Mart's current benefits offering through three
lenses - cost trends, [employee] satisfaction, and public
reputation."8 The Memorandum is divided into three sections:
3. The author manages the nation's only law school-based senior legal
helpline (The University of South Dakota School of Law Senior Legal Helpline,
providing pro-bono legal information, advice and assistance to persons fifty-five
and older).
4. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-34 (Westlaw current through Aug. 17,
2006).
5. 544 U.S. 228 (2005).
6. Id. at 232.
7. Miille v. ShopKo Stores, Inc., No. LACV133694 (Iowa D. Ct. Woodbury
County filed Apr. 20, 2006) [hereinafter ShopKo Class Action].
8. Wal-Mart Memorandum, supra note 1, at 1.
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(1) "a detailed analysis of the three most significant benefits-
related challenges";9 (2) a detailed discussion of the "nine
limited-risk initiatives and five bold steps" being
recommended;10 and (3) a summary of the "combined impact of
the limited-risk initiatives and the bold steps."" The
Memorandum stated that:
Wal-Mart's healthcare benefit is one of the most
pressing reputation issues we face because well-
funded, well-organized critics, as well as state
government officials, are carefully scrutinizing Wal-
Mart's offering. Moreover, our offering is vulnerable to
at least some of their criticisms, especially with regard
to the affordability of coverage and Associates' reliance
on Medicaid.12
The Memorandum discusses in detail what Chambers
identifies as nine "limited-risk initiatives," projecting to reduce
2011 benefits by sixteen percent, and five "bold steps," which
she estimates would yield an additional nine percent reduction.'3
Total benefits costs were "modeled to be at or below 1.9 percent
of sales . . . in 2011."14 Cost reduction is the linchpin of this
analysis. As discussed below,'" federal courts have fashioned an
ADEA "cost-defense" whereby employers are permitted to
remove older employees, not because they are old, but because,
generally, older employees have longer tenure and are therefore
more expensive.16 In this case, Wal-Mart targets the cost of
providing benefits, particularly the cost of providing
healthcare.17  Globally, U.S. employers are competitively
disadvantaged by the burden of providing employer-based
health benefits in contrast to virtually all other industrialized
nations, which provide universal coverage through their tax
9. Id.
10. Id. at 2.
11. Id. at 3.
12. Id. at 2.
13. Id. at 17.
14. Id.
15. See infra notes 37-58 and accompanying text.
16. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 612 (1993).
17. See Wal-Mart Memorandum, supra note 1.
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bases. Further, U.S. healthcare costs are two to three times
greater than in most industrialized nations.18 Chambers used
cost trends from 2002 through 2005 to sound the alarm. 9 During
that period, Wal-Mart's benefits costs grew faster than sales,
from 1.5 to 1.9 percent of sales, from $2.8 billion to $4.2 billion, a
rate of fifteen percent per year.20 Notably, health benefits grew
at nineteen percent per year during the same period.21 The
utilization of medical services grew by ten percent per year,
identified as "the primary driver of the rapid growth in [Wal-
Mart's] healthcare costs." 22 Chambers attributes more than half
of this increase to what she characterizes as "three Wal-Mart-
specific workforce factors (distinct from national trends):" (1) an
aging workforce; (2) workers "sicker than the national
population, particularly with obesity-related diseases"; and (3) a
segment of the workforce that "consumes healthcare
inefficiently, in a pattern similar to a Medicaid population." 23
While the cost of healthcare has been burdensome for the
company, ironically the cost for its employees has been even
more burdensome. Wal-Mart employees "spend 8 percent of
their income on healthcare (premiums plus deductibles plus out-
of-pocket expenses) for themselves and their families, nearly
twice the national average." 24
THE OFFENDING "BOLD STEP"
The five "bold steps" proposed by Chambers were: (1) "[mjove
all [employees] to 'progressively designed' consumer-driven
18. JAMES W. HENDERSON, HEALTH EcoNOMICS & POLIcY 386 tbl. 16.1 (3d ed.
2005) (reporting per diem healthcare expenditures for Japan at $1,984; Germany,
$2,808; France, $2,561; Canada, $2,792, and the United States, at $4,887).




23. Id. at 4-5. "Our population tends to over utilize [sic] emergency room and
hospital services and underutilize prescriptions and doctor visits. This pattern is
most evident among our low-income Associates, and one hypothesis is that this
behavior may result from prior experience with Medicaid programs." Id.
24. Id. at 7.
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health plans to help control cost trends";2 5 (2) reduce the
company's contribution to its 401(k) program from
approximately four percent to approximately three percent of
wages; 26 (3) "[r]edesign benefits and other aspects of the
[employee] experience, such as job design, to attract a healthier,
more productive workforce"; 27 (4) "[mlake a series of strategic
investments in [the] healthcare offering so it can better
withstand external scrutiny";28 and (5) improve communication
of benefits and "work to shape the outcomes of state and
national healthcare reform efforts." 29 It is bold step number
three that captures the image of my sixty-three-year-old helpline
caller, suffering from deep-vein thrombosis of the legs, pushing
carts across an ice-packed lot on a December day in Iowa. The
offending conduct is inherent in the ShopKo practice and in the
Memorandum recommendation that Wal-Mart "[d]esign all jobs
to include some physical activity (e.g., all cashiers do some cart
gathering)."3 0 The recommendation was made in the belief that
"[g]iven the significant savings from even a small improvement
in the health of [the employee] base, Wal-Mart should seek to
attract a healthier workforce."3 This language was the object of
unflattering headlines in the media; for example, "Wal-Mart
Memo: Unhealthy Need Not Apply,"32 "Wal-Mart Memo Lists
Ways to Cut Benefits: One Idea Would Be to Discourage Hiring
Unhealthy People,"33 and "Fat? Over 40? Don't Bother Applying
for a Wal-Mart Job." Andrew Stern, president of the Service
25. Id. at 11.
26. Id. at 13.
27. Id. at 14.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 15.
30. Id. at 14.
31. Id.
32. Wal-Mart Memo: Unhealthy Need Not Apply, CNNMONEY.COM, Oct. 26, 2005,
http://money.cnn.com/2005/10/26/news/fortune500/walmart/index.htm.
33. Michael Barbaro & Steven Greenhouse, Wal-Mart Memo Lists Ways to Cut
Benefits: One Idea Would Be to Discourage Hiring Unhealthy People, Oct. 27, 2005,
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f-/c/a/2005/10/27/BUG3JFE
L7F1.DTL (last visited Sept. 8, 2006).
34. Katherine Griffiths, Fat? Over 40? Don't Bother Applying for a Wal-Mart Job,
Oct. 27, 2005, THE INDEPENDENT (UK), at 8, available at http://www.commondreams.
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Employees International Union (SEIU), told the Wall Street
Journal "[w]hen you add physical requirements to jobs that don't
need them, you begin to weed out a whole pool of people such
as the elderly, the obese, and people with pre-existing medical
conditions.... I think this memo steps over the line of what's
legal."" Whether his prediction is correct will be tested in the
ShopKo Class Action. The complaint includes a declaratory
judgment count asking the court to rule that the practice violates
the ADEA as a matter of law and to enjoin its implementation.3 6
ADEA AND THE "COST DEFENSE"
Congress enacted the ADEA in response to evidence that older
workers experienced much of the same bias directed at women
and minorities, finding that "older workers [found] themselves
disadvantaged in their efforts to retain employment, and
especially to regain employment when displaced from jobs."37
Now, nearly forty years later, it appears that the workplace
protections thought to have been contained in the ADEA, are not
there after all; that, as implied by one court, the act was never
intended to inhibit the process by which a free market economy
creates real jobs and wealth.38  Although the Act largely
eliminated compulsory retirement based upon fixed, arbitrary
age limits, the Supreme Court significantly neutered the Act in
Hazen Paper, holding that Hazen Paper did not violate the ADEA
when it terminated sixty-two-year-old Biggins shortly before his
org/headlines05/1027-05.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2006). "If you are on the wrong
side of 40 and not as fit as you'd like to be, don't bother applying for a job at Wal-
Mart. That is the message for workers in America - revealed in a secret memo,
laying out a plan by Wal-Mart to make it harder for older, less healthy people to get
a job at one of its legions of stores in the U.S." Id.
35. Zimmerman et al., supra note 2, at B1.
36. Complaint at 7, Miille v. ShopKo Stores, Inc., No. LACV133694 (Iowa D. Ct.
Woodbury County filed Apr. 20, 2006).
37. 29 U.S.C.A. § 621(a)(1) (Westlaw current through Aug. 17, 2006). The
ADEA applies to any employer affecting commerce with twenty or more employees
and covered individuals who are at least forty years of age. 29 U.S.C.A. § 631
(Westlaw current through Aug. 17, 2006).
38. See Camacho v. Sears Roebuck de Puerto Rico, 939 F. Supp. 113, 121-22
(D.P.R. 1996).
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pension would vest because the termination was based on a
"reasonable factor other than age." 39 That factor was the desire
to avoid the costs associated with paying him pension monies.4
Hazen signaled that employers could replace older, generally
more expensive workers, with younger, generally less expensive
workers, without running afoul of the ADEA. That is, the
ADEA did not confer upon the courts the prerogative to second-
guess such management decision-making. In a competitive free
market, an employee may be terminated because she or he costs
more than an employer is willing to pay; and if another person,
regardless of age, is willing to perform the same job at a lower
cost, the ADEA may not protect the over-forty higher-cost
employee.
Circuit court cases illustrate the impact of Hazen Paper. In
Mullin v. Raytheon Co.,41 the First Circuit held that the
defendant's need to downsize in the competitive defense
industry was justified, and the employer did not violate the
ADEA by lowering the plaintiff's wage grade to match
Raytheon's restructured wage-and-salary program.42 Raytheon
reinforces a judicial trend allowing employers to remove older
workers from their ranks, not because they are older, but
because they cost more than younger workers. In Anderson v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp.,43 the plaintiff alleged he was discharged
as a unit manager for the sole purpose of reducing costs."" The
Seventh Circuit observed that while there was a general
correlation between age and higher wage costs, that correlation
"is not perfect."45 The court observed that "[the plaintiff] could
39. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 501 U.S. 604, 612-13 (1993) (interpreting 29
U.S.C. § 623(f)(1)).
40. Id. Biggins remedy, therefore, was under ERISA, not the ADEA. Id. at 612.
41. 164 F.3d 696 (1st Cir. 1999).
42. Id. at 699. The plaintiff had worked for Raytheon for twenty-nine years and
was at the highest management grade. Id. at 697. His downgrade was part of a
downsizing that was deemed by the court to be a legitimate business decision not to
be second-guessed by the courts and therefore a non-discriminatory rationale for
reducing company costs. Id. at 698.
43. 13 F.3d 1120 (7th Cir. 1994).
44. Id. at 1125.
45. Id. at 1126.
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not prove age discrimination even if he was fired simply because
[the defendant] desired to reduce its salary costs by discharging
him."14 Anderson stands for the proposition that employer costs
in the form of wage and salary are a reasonable factor other than
age; therefore, eliminating older workers because they are more
expensive than younger workers does not violate the ADEA. In
the ShopKo Class Action, the defendant likely will argue that the
desire to promote employee health and thereby reduce benefit
costs is a reasonable factor other than age, which would permit
the discharge of an employee unable to perform the redesigned
job duties.
The Eighth Circuit followed the Seventh Circuit's approach
from Anderson in Snow v. Ridgeview Medical Center,47 in which the
plaintiff contended she was a senior employee and earned the
highest salary in her department.48 The court, relying on Hazen
Paper, concluded that age and years of service were distinct
factors that lacked correlation; decisions based on years of
service (and not age) relied upon reasonable factors other than
age. 49 This cost defense was successfully raised in Marks v. Loral
Corp.,50 a California Court of Appeals decision that affirmed a
jury instruction stating, "An employer is entitled to choose
employees with lower salaries, even though this may result in
choosing younger employees. If the choice is based on salary,
there is no age discrimination." 51 This court made no subtle
distinctions related to age-tenure correlations. It held that as
long as salary costs were not a pretext for a decision actually
based on age, there is no violation of the ADEA.5 2 The California
court acknowledged that a "whippersnapper MBA [may]
increase corporate profits - and his or her own compensation -
by across-the-board layoffs," but the court opined that Congress
46. Id.
47. 128 F.3d 1201 (8th Cir. 1997).
48. Id. at 1208.
49. Id.
50. 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1 (Ct. App. 1997).
51. Id. at 7.
52. Id. at 23.
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never intended that age discrimination laws should inhibit a free
market economy that creates jobs and wealth.53 The Loral
decision triggered protests that resulted in the California
legislature overriding the court's ruling by amending its Fair
Employment and Housing Act in the belief that anti-age
discrimination laws, like all employment-related statutes,
inherently interfere with free-market decisionmaking.
These decisions support a growing judicial view that
employment decisions based upon costs (whether pension,
salary, or presumably other costs) stand outside the prohibitions
of the ADEA. The issue posed by this article, therefore, is
whether employer decisions intended to reduce healthcare costs
will be treated with the same deference. May an employer
impose physically taxing duties on all employees, not because
such work assignments are necessary to furnish a product or
service, but because such exertion promotes a healthier and
more productive workforce, thereby reducing the cost of
providing health care? Moreover, while Hazen did not address
whether disparate impact is applicable to ADEA claims, might
the correlation between mandated physical labor and age be
found in the definition of disparate impact as developed by the
Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.55 proscribing "not
only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form,
but discriminatory in operation"? 6
DISPARATE IMPACT UNDER THE ADEA
The circuits long had been divided over whether the disparate
impact doctrine could be used to prove age discrimination
under the ADEA. The Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits held
that disparate impact is available under the ADEA.57 The First,
53. Id. at 24.
54. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12941 (West 2005) (expressly declaring "its rejection of
appeal opinion in Marks v. Loral Corp").
55. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
56. Id. at 431.
57. Criley v. Delta Airlines Inc., 119 F.3d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 1997); Lewis v.
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Third, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits questioned
the doctrine's application to the ADEA. 8 The remaining circuits
have not addressed the issue. However, now that the Supreme
Court has affirmed its application, 9 it will be interesting to
observe how strongly the dissenting circuits embrace such
claims. A brief in support of the plaintiff's position in the
ShopKo Class Action should focus on the ADEA's language,
congressional intent, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) treatment of ADEA claims, the doctrine's
limitations under Hazen, and the Supreme Court's affirmation of
its application.
The statutory language is both problematic and helpful to
the ShopKo Class Action plaintiff because the purpose of the Act
was to "promote employment of older persons based on their
ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in
employment; [and] to help employers and workers find ways of
meeting problems arising from the impact of age on
employment.""o The problematic aspect resides within the
contention that a person should be free of age discrimination as
long as she or he has the "ability" to perform the duties required
by a particular job classification. The test, reasons the Act, is not
a matter of chronological age, but whether a person is capable of
performing the duties reasonably required to produce the
product or service. The ADEA challenge to the Wal-
Mart/ShopKo policy turns on a correlation between aging, the
progressive deterioration of physical capacity, and ultimately
Aerospace Cmty. Credit Union, 114 F.3d 745, 750 (8th Cir. 1997); Frank v. United
Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 856 (9th Cir. 2000); E.E.O.C. v. Local 350, Plumbers &
Pipefitters, 998 F.2d 641, 648 n.2 (9th Cir. 1992); Palmer v. United States, 794 F.2d
534, 538 (9th Cir. 1986).
58. Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 701 (1st Cir. 1999); DiBiase v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 732-735 (3d Cir. 1995); Lyon v. Ohio Educ.
Ass'n & Prof'1 Staff Union, 53 F.3d 135, 139 n.5 (6th Cir. 1995); E.E.O.C. v. Francis
W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1077-78 (7th Cir. 1994); Elis v. United Airlines, Inc., 78
F.3d 999, 1009 (10th Cir. 1996); Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322, 1326 (11th
Cir. 2001).
59. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 232 (2005).
60. 29 U.S.C.A. § 621(b) (Westlaw current through Aug. 17, 2006) (emphasis
added).
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the "ability" of a worker to perform assigned duties such as
gathering carts and moving appliances. Accordingly, an
employer probably will assert that the law permits it to
terminate an employee who lacks the ability to perform the
physical tasks required by a specific job description. In other
words, the reasonable factor other than age in this instance is the
inability to perform the job. This position accords with the
Eleventh Circuit's rejection of the doctrine in Adams v. Florida
Power Corp., noting the Secretary's recommendation that
"Congress ban arbitrary discrimination, such as disparate
treatment based on stereotypical perceptions of the elderly, but
that factors affecting older workers, such as policies with
disparate impact, be addressed in alternative ways." 61 Also, the
court examined the history and amendments to Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) expressly permitting
disparate impact claims in cases involving race and religion
while resisting similar treatment to the ADEA. 62 These pre-2005
rulings illustrate the dramatic turnaround enunciated by the
Supreme Court's in Smith v. City of Jackson.
STEPPING OVER THE "BUSINESS NECESSITY" LINE
When SEIU president Andrew Stern told the Wall Street Journal
he believed that adding "physical requirements to jobs that
don't need them steps over the line of what's legal," 63
presumably he had in mind the "business necessity" test, which
has been applied by courts recognizing disparate impact claims
under Title VII," which does not address age discrimination. 6 5
As previously noted, the circuits, prior to 2005, were split on the
61. Adams, 255 F.3d at 1325.
62. Id. at 1325-26.
63. Zimmerman et al., supra note 2, at Bl.
64. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 655-58 (1989) (holding
no disparate impact discrimination to be excused by business necessity exception).
65. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352 §§ 701-716,42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 2000e through 2000e-17 (Westlaw current through Aug. 17, 2006) (prohibiting




ADEA application of the disparate impact theory, but there was
a strong trend against its application.6 6 Whether the Wal-
Mart/ShopKo job redesign might be protected under a "business
necessity" defense requires an examination of how disparate
treatment has been treated under Title VII. Smith v. City of
Jackson affirms the legitimacy of disparate impact claims brought
under the ADEA, but does not give it strong status. The
Supreme Court's Title VII cases have distinguished between
"disparate treatment" and "disparate impact." 67  The
fundamental difference between disparate treatment and
disparate impact is that under disparate treatment theory,
employers are liable for intentional discrimination, whereas
under disparate impact theory, employers are liable for the
discriminatory consequences of their selection criteria,
regardless of their motivation for adopting them.68
Analysis of redesigning job duties may include disparate
impact of a neutral rule or disparate treatment by intention,
either of which may be defensible under the business necessity
exception. Mandating across-the-board physical activity to
promote good health and reduced healthcare costs, rather than
as a matter of "business necessity," exposes the policy to a
disparate impact claim as defined in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., as
proscribing,
[N]ot only overt discrimination but also practices that
are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The
touchstone is business necessity....
... [Glood intent or absence of discriminatory intent
does not redeem employment procedures or testing
mechanisms that operate as "built-in headwinds" for
minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job
capability.69
The reduction of health costs as a business necessity
66. See supra notes 57-58.
67. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
68. Id.
69. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971).
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appears to have facial neutrality and thus lacks the type of ageist
animus required for disparate treatment claims. On the other
hand, when the Memorandum's proposed benefit changes are
considered as a whole, the sentiment expressed in the headline,
"Fat? Over 40? Don't Bother Applying for a Wal-Mart Job" may
indeed subject their adoption to a "disparate treatment," rather
than a "disparate impact," analysis.7 0 Its emphasis on recruiting
a healthy and more productive workforce, by implication,
suggests the recruitment and retention of a younger workforce.71
AGING AND THE CAPACITY FOR PHYSICAL ACTIVITY
It is perhaps axiomatic that increased frailty is a companion of
aging. It has been described thusly:
The inevitable decline in physical vigor is the most
salient feature of aging. With advancing age bones
gradually lose calcium, become weakened, and fracture
easily. The bones in the hip widen, the shoulders
narrow, joints become stiff and painful, and walking
becomes more difficult.
Almost all of the elderly suffer from some loss of
vision, including a loss of ability to see close objects,
sensitivity to glare, loss of peripheral vision, and
difficulty adjusting from light to dark ....
... [T]he Journal of Neurology indicates that the brain
typically loses about 10 percent of its mass between
ages twenty and forty as the fjord-like crevices on the
brain surface - essential for thought - deepen and
widen.72
Because the employee must establish disparate impact
discrimination with respect to each component of a prima facie
case, the ShopKo Class Action plaintiffs will be required to offer
evidence that cart gathering, driving a forklift, and loading
appliances into vehicles was activity that would unnecessarily
70. See Wal-mart Memorandum, supra note 1.
71. Griffiths, supra note 34, at 8.
72. LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & ALISON MCCHRYSTAL BARNES, ELDER LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 14 (1st ed. 1992).
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jeopardize the job security of older workers.73 The plaintiff
should be prepared to show that: (1) she and other members of
the class belong to the over-forty protected group; (2) the job
design was a condition of employment envisioned by the Act;
(3) the job design does not meet the "business exception"
criteria; and (4) its implementation will disproportionately and
negatively effect older workers. The touchstone will be business
necessity.74
The Memorandum does not advance a traditional "business
necessity" rationale in support of the recommendation to
redesign jobs to include physical activity; rather, its rationale is
based on the reduction of Wal-Mart's healthcare costs because
physical activity is conducive to improved health.75  It is
improbable that ShopKo will argue that its cashiers and
customer service employees must gather carts and load
appliances as a necessary condition of conducting its core
business. Rather, ShopKo must rely on a finding that the
reduction of healthcare costs is a reasonable factor other than
age that immunizes an employer from ADEA liability. This
theory did not elicit sympathy from the EEOC complaint in the
ShopKo Class Action because the EEOC issued a right to sue
letter.76
A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
Today's law shapes tomorrow's society. Wal-Mart employment
practices will influence the workplace for all Americans, a fact
recognized by Chambers in recommending that the company
improve its communication so that "over the long term, [it can]
work to shape the outcomes of state and national healthcare
73. Courts in ADEA cases rely upon the broad four-part test for establishing a
prima facie case for an ADEA complaint. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
74. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (identifying "business
necessity" as the touchstone of establishing disparate impact discrimination).
75. See Wal-Mart Memorandum, supra note 1.
76. Letter from EEOC to Carol A. Miille (on file with author).
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reform efforts."" The Wal-Mart/ShopKo job redesign issue
resurrects images of survival-of-the-fittest conditions that
existed in this country prior to the labor movement.
My father described an event that occurred on a
construction site sometime in the late 1920s. He was about
twenty years old and fit. He was working with a man about
thirty-five years old, who had been gassed during World War I
and suffered from a lingering lung disease. They were digging a
foundation by hand, loading wheelbarrows of dirt and pushing
each load out of the entrenchment via a ramp consisting of two
wooden planks. When the veteran was unable to push the
loaded wheelbarrow out of the pit, my father instinctively
attempted to help him. The foreman ordered my father to stand
back, stating that if the veteran could not complete the task he
would be fired. The wheelbarrow tipped, the dirt spilled, and
the veteran with impaired lungs was terminated. He was
terminated, not because of his age, but because he could not
perform the tasks required by the job design.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we must ask: How bold was Ms. Chambers' bold
step number three calling for a job redesign for all employees
that would include physical activity such as cart gathering?78
And to what extent may an employer incorporate into job
designs a level of physical activity for the ostensible purpose of
improving the physical well-being of its workforce? Does the
ADEA stand as a meaningful obstacle to such practices? Will
ShopKo be able to persuade the court that its job redesign is
ultimately intended to save benefits costs in the highly-
competitive retail market? And might not ShopKo escape
ADEA liability by providing an exemption to employees who
can demonstrate they have a medical condition or physical
weakness that prevents them from performing certain physical
77. Wal-Mart Memorandum, supra note 1, at 15.




The judicial treatment of the ShopKo Class Action harbors
broad public policy implications. "Big-Box" retailers like Wal-
Mart and ShopKo are at the cusp of the American
transformation from a manufacturing to a service economy,
from twenty-five-dollars-an-hour union-protected jobs to seven-
dollars-an-hour part-time employment without collective
bargaining capacity. The Wal-Mart Memorandum may be a
template for the type of workplace waiting for the next
generation of working Americans. It appears that ShopKo, at
least in one of its Iowa stores, has implemented a job design
requiring all of its non-managerial employees to perform duties
requiring physical exertion. A strategic objective to recruit and
retain a "younger and healthier" workforce portends a labor
market that expels workers years before they are financially
prepared to leave it. Chambers describes the -benefits of a
"recruit-and-retain-the-young" strategy:
A healthier workforce will lead to lower health
insurance costs, lower absenteeism through fewer sick
days, and higher productivity. It will be far easier to
attract and retain a healthier workforce than it will be
to change behavior in an existing one. These moves
would also dissuade unhealthy people from coming to
work at Wal-Mart.79
It is safe to say that Chambers is correct when contending
that the prospect of gathering carts and hoisting appliances into
vehicles would "dissuade unhealthy people from coming to
work at Wal-Mart."s0 She invites, however, consideration of this
commentary's central issue: whether job design not essential for
production or service purposes, but rather primarily structured
to dissuade "unhealthy people" from entering a workforce, by
implication and in practice also will dissuade "older people"
from entering a workforce, or once there, from remaining in the
79. Id. at 14. "Even a modest shift in Wal-Mart's ability to attract and retain a
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workforce.
The disparate impact doctrine, articulated by the Supreme
Court in Griggs, accommodates the cart-gathering fact pattern as
a practice that likely would have a disproportionate and
discriminatory impact upon the class of workers afforded
protection under the Act. These facts appear more definitive
than the facts of Smith v. City of Jackson, wherein the city
implemented a new wage structure to ensure that entry-level
salaries of police department employees were competitive with
the average market wage for similar positions in the region.81
The Fifth Circuit allowed the petitioners to proceed with
discovery for the purpose of establishing intent, then affirmed
the dismissal of the disparate impact claim on the assumed
grounds that it was not cognizable under the ADEA. 8 2 The
Supreme Court utilized Hazen Paper to invalidate the Fifth
Circuit's rationale and to clarify the proper application of the
reasonable-factor-other-than-age defense.83 In examining the
text of the ADEA, the plurality opinion, authored by Justice
Stevens and joined in concurrence by Justice Scalia, relied upon
language in the ADEA prohibiting employers' actions that
"deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's . .. age."8
In the ShopKo Class Action, ShopKo can be expected to raise
the reasonable-factor-other-than-age defense, asserting that the
ability to perform the assigned job duties, and not an employee's
age, is the controlling criteria for employment. It may correctly
argue that its new job designs are not a manifestation of animus
toward the elderly but rather are motivated by its desire to
promote better health for all employees, regardless of age.
However, the plurality in Smith effectively dismisses animus as
an essential condition for a successful disparate claim, noting
81. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 231 (2005).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 237-40.
84. Id. at 235 (quoting 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(a)(2)).
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that age discrimination arises predominantly from arbitrary
discrimination, rather than animus, and that certain institutional
practices may adversely affect older workers.5 Job design for
the predominant purpose of dissuading "unhealthy workers"
from seeking employment, or for the purpose of lowering its
health plan costs, is the type of practice recognized in Smith as
having a prohibited adverse affect on older workers.8 6
85. Id. at 240-41.
86. See id. at 235-38.
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